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The first successful effort at global agricultural trade reform began 
with the launching of the Uruguay Round in 1986, which led to the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in 
1994.   
 
The Uruguay Round succeeded where seven previous rounds failed 
because of the framework that was developed.  The architects of 
the Uruguay Round agreement believed, rightly as it turned out, 
that political forces opposing reform could only be overcome 
through comprehensive negotiations.  All countries had to be 
willing to put all policies for all agricultural products on the table.   
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This was an issue of fundamental fairness.  Countries provide 
support and protection to agriculture in different ways.  Previous 
negotiations had focused primarily on tariffs, while ignoring 
equally trade-distorting measures, such as variable levies, quotas, 
export subsidies and domestic supports.  Countries had also 
effectively excluded politically sensitive sectors from 
commitments.  The reformers were determined the Uruguay Round 




The result was the now well-known three pillars approach.  By 
requiring countries to undertake commitments on market access, 
export subsidies, and domestic support, the Uruguay Round 
Agreement established a new framework for agricultural trade 
liberalization.  The first round of cuts – 36 percent for market 
access, 36 percent by value and 21 percent by volume for export 
subsidies, and 20 percent for domestic support – was less   3
ambitious than many had hoped, but it was a start and Article 20 of 
the Agreement committed countries to continue the reform process 
through future negotiations. 
 
Which brings us to the Doha Round.  With the framework 
established, the focus of the negotiations is the level of ambition – 
how far to cut and how fast.  There are two basic approaches.  One, 
advocated by the EU, Japan and assorted allies, is to continue the 
straight percentage reduction formula agreed to in the Uruguay 
Round.  The second, advocated by the United States and the Cairns 





The U.S. harmonizing approach attempts to address the 
fundamental inequities left-over from the Uruguay Round.  The 
initial round of cuts in the three pillars did little to reduce the great   4
disparities in support and protection provided by major agricultural 
producing economies.  These disparities exist in all three areas – 






In market access the inequities appear in the form of widely 
disparate tariff levels.  The global average of agricultural tariffs is 
62 percent.  The United States is at the low end with an average 
tariff of 12 percent.  Japan is among the highest for developed 
countries with an average tariff of 51 percent.  What the average 
tariff levels do not reveal is the ridiculously high tariff levels for 
individual products.  Japan, for example has a tariff on rice imports 
that is currently 490 percent.   
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There is no way to reconcile a tariff of 490 percent with the 
commitment in the Doha Declaration to trade liberalization.  If one 
country is allowed to maintain a tariff of that level for a sensitive 
sector, then why wouldn’t all countries demand the right to do the 
same?  Fairness dictates that all agricultural tariffs should be 
reduced to substantially equivalent levels.  The Swiss 25 formula 




The Harbinson paper takes a step in the right direction but doesn’t 
go quite far enough.  It calls for a minimum 45 percent cut in 
tariffs over 90 percent.  A tariff of over 270 percent may not be 
quite as ridiculous as one of 490 percent, but it is still pretty 
effective in preventing trade from taking place.   
 
Japan is the largest developed country rice consumer in the world.  
It should be prepared to do its fair share to liberalize agricultural   6
trade.  Instead, not only does Japan want to keep its rice tariff at a 
sub-orbital level, it objects to increasing its tariff-rate quota by the 






The case for export subsidies is even clearer.  One WTO member 
accounts for nearly 90 percent of the worlds export subsidies.  The 
message from the rest of the world has been unequivocal – export 
subsidies must be eliminated.  The Harbinson text recognizes this 
remarkable consensus.  The real debate will be over how quickly 




[SLIDE 7]   7
 
The United States and the EU are the two largest agricultural 
economies in the world.  Not surprisingly, we are also the two 
largest subsidizers in the world.  What may be surprising, 
particularly given the global attention on U.S. farm spending, is 
which one of us is the largest and by how much.  The EU’s total 
allowable domestic support level is $78.3 billion.  This includes de 
minimus support, but not blue box support, which has no limit.  
The comparable figure for the United States is $28.7 billion.  In 
2000, the EU’s actual spending level, including blue box support, 




The U.S. proposal achieves equity.  It would bring EU and U.S. 
support down to roughly the same level.  Given that our 
agricultural economies are roughly the same size, this seems like 




The Harbinson paper fails to rectify the imbalance.  It would bring 
total U.S. support down to just over $12 billion while the EU 
would be allowed to spend over $42 billion, more than three times 
as much.  This is simply unpalatable for the United States.  We are 
prepared to bring our support down as far as the Harbinson 
proposal would require, but only if the EU brings its support down 
to that level as well. 
 
Significant reductions in farm subsidies will be the single most 
important standard by which many countries will judge whether 
the Doha Round is successful.   
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The United States remains committed to the ambitious objectives 
we laid out in our proposal 6 months ago.  With the March 31 
deadline fast approaching, some are starting to back away, saying 
they aren’t ready, that internal reforms have to come first.  We 
committed to this timeline and these objectives.  We all committed 
to them.  If we are going to live up to that commitment, the 
negotiations must start now.  The participants will not accept the 
dictates of one member’s internal policy decisions as a substitute 
for negotiations.   
 
Our goal is fundamental reform through an equitable process.  If 
we achieve that in Geneva, we will bring home an agreement that 
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“We recall the long-term objective referred to in the 
Agreement [on Agriculture] to establish a fair and 
market-oriented trading system through a program 
of fundamental reform encompassing strengthened 
rules and specific commitments on support and 
protection….  We reconfirm our commitment to 
this program.”
Franz Fischler, Tokyo, February 16, 2003:
“We don’t do reforms on the invitation from the 
outside, neither from America nor anywhere else.”
Commitment to Reform